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Forschungsgruppe Zukunftsfragen
New constitutional agreement meets new focus of foreign policy
In the last years the EU has been focusing primarily on internal affairs, such as the
quarrel over a new treaty. Foreign affairs have been dominated mostly by the
European Neighborhood Policy and political and economic relationships with the
immediate neighbors by land and sea have been strengthened.The Spanish takeover
of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on January 1st, 2010, how-
ever, might herald changes in this respect. First of all, the introduction of the Lisbon
Treaty, whose implementation the Spanish presidency has strongly committed itself
to, will end years of struggling for an appropriate political and institutional setting
and hopefully bring about various improvements. Secondly, the Spanish presidency
has also announced it will pay more attention to other regions, first and foremost the
region with which Spain has close economic, cultural and linguistic ties, i.e. Latin
America.
Latin America is so important to Spain that, when joining the European Union in
1986, it insisted on a stipulation in its accession treaty stating the close connections
to this specific region. By serving a bridging role between Europe and its former colo-
nies, Spain could at the same time end its previous tacking back and forth between
an orientation towards Europe or towards its former colonies. Thus, it comes as no
surprise that Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero announced that the
Spanish Presidency would be a “Euro-Atlantic” one, paying special attention to the
relations between the EU and the Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Foreign politics under the Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty seeks to increase the efficiency, democracy, transparency and the
say of citizens and the European Parliament in the EU, as well as to promote
European values and to strengthen the Union's international role.
To achieve these ends, two new offices have been created: the President of the
European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. The latter combines the former positions of the High Representative
for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for External
Relations and will be equipped with a diplomatic service. After hearings in the
European Parliament and some additional deferments, the candidates have finally
taken up office and are just starting their official functions.
The upcoming presidency will be the fourth held by Spain since becoming a mem-
ber of the European Union (previous presidencies took place in 1989, 1995, and
2002). Besides implementing the Lisbon Treaty and strengthening connections to
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Latin America, the other top priorities of the Spanish Presidency vary widely, from
addressing the repercussions of the financial crisis, to combating climate change,
promoting judicial and police cooperation, and enabling Europe to speak with one
voice on the international scene, as anchored in the Lisbon Treaty.
Ironically, due to these same foreign policy objectives, the Spanish agenda for its presi-
dency, though formally within the wording with the Lisbon Treaty, might create tens-
ions with the new institutional settings. In the first place, the creation of two new
posts with strong competences has taken away the international role from the rota-
ting presidency. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, foreign policy can at the best be formu-
lated in the quadrangle of the presidency, High Representative, President of the
European Council and President of the Commission. It is a coincidence that this first
happens while Spain holds the presidency of the council, as for the last ten years, the
post of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was
held by a Spanish compatriot, Javier Solana. Secondly, as pointed out before, Spain
has its own national interests in its former colonies. Using its public position presi-
ding over the council of the European Union to strengthen its foreign trade ties might,
especially under the new institutional settings, provoke resentments.
Thus, Spain is required to carefully weigh its own interests against the Union’s larg-
er interests.
Under no circumstances should a unilateral Spanish attempt on any issue (for ex-
ample, economic involvement in South America) harm the strategic priorities the
Union has given itself, i.e. to be recognized internationally as a serious and respec-
ted actor. In order to be recognized as a unified external actor that speaks with one
voice, open disagreement between the four EU-internal actors on foreign policy
priorities should preferably be avoided.
An easy solution would be to advise the country holding the rotating presidency to
cede its foreign policy making role to the two new positions. After all, coping with
the economic crisis and fighting climate change offer enough challenges for the
Spanish presidency. However, changing the agenda and clearing the “international
field”for the President of the European Council and the High Representative would,
at least in this specific case, not be advisable.
One has to recognize the fact that for one whole month the Spanish presidency will
take place without both a President of the European Council and a High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as both Herman Van Rompuy
and Catherine Ashton have only recently taken office and are at the moment occu-
pied with finding their roles and establishing administrative structures, such as the
European External Action Service. During this time, the Union needs a foreign po-
licy and who else should shape this if not the rotating presidency? 
However, these are exceptional circumstances that again require careful balancing:
on the one hand, Spain has to fill in until the new institutional setting is fully func-
tioning, on the other hand, it has to keep in mind that this is a temporary role and
that downgrading the new leading personnel to representative offices would harm
the Union’s aim to be recognized as a serious actor in the international arena.
Luckily, there is little fear that Spain might take advantage of its position and over-
ride the President of the Commission and the Foreign Representative. Rather,
Naab · EU and Latin America
C·A·P Aktuell · 1 · 2010 Page 3
Spanish Secretary of State Diego Lopez Garrido has announced that the Spanish
presidency intends to strengthen the leading personnel.
In fact, sabotaging the newcomers would not only prevent the EU from playing a
more coherent international role and thus seriously damage its reputation, but
would also contradict the stated Spanish priority of supporting the implementation
of the Lisbon Treaty.
Latin America as a region of strategic interest
The special focus Spain puts on Latin America is in accordance with the European
Union’s interests in this region. The first EU-Latin America and Caribbean-summit
in Rio de Janeiro in 1999 started a partnership based on a common cultural heritage
and common values and involves close cooperation in political, economic, cultural
and scientific areas. This bi-regional partnership includes manifold relationships,
activities and cooperation mechanisms at the executive government level (alterna-
ting summits and meetings of the foreign ministers every two years and regular
meetings of senior officials) and at the levels of civil society, parliaments and entre-
preneurs.
In economic terms, the EU is the second biggest trading partner for Latin American
and Caribbean (LAC) states (after the USA). LAC countries make up five percent of
the EU’s external trade and the trade volume more than doubled from 1990 to 2006.
Exporting for the main part agricultural products and natural resources, the LAC
countries are an expanding market for European technology and chemical products.
The EU already holds the biggest share of foreign direct investment in Latin America
and the Caribbean (68 billion US$ in 2005) and is also the biggest donor for deve-
lopment cooperation (2.69 billion  from 2007-2013).
Since the 1999 Rio-summit, several bi- and multi-lateral meetings have contributed
to strengthening the partnership. Europe’s interest in the region continues to be
high and the EU can strongly benefit from the Spanish announcement to use its
presidency to strengthen ties with Latin America and the Caribbean, which will first
and foremost be shown in the importance Spain attaches the EuLac-Summit.
Spanish presidency as “Honest Broker”
In political respects, Latin America is characterized by a gap between the rather “con-
ventional”political camp in most of the countries on the one side and the left-wing
populist or left-wing nationalist camp, exemplified by the Venezuelan president
Hugo Chavez, on the other side. While moderate states are a large majority, the year
of 2009 has also seen the first coup in Latin America for almost three decades.
During the constitutional crisis following the dismissal of the Honduran President
Manuel Zelaya, Spain made its mark as a calm mediator. Together with the Ibero-
American summit, Spain advised consideration between parties and insisted on
adherence to the constitution by demanding reinstatement of the toppled president.
This shows that most of Latin America (except maybe for Chavez, whose rebuke by
Juan Carlos at the Ibero-American summit in 2007 is unforgettable) accepts Spain as
an honest broker.
This privileged role might also pay off with regards to a country that is about to ex-
perience dramatic institutional changes. Already opening, albeit carefully, socialist
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Cuba will sooner or later have to face the question of how to handle the post-Castro
era. The Obama administration’s easing of the embargo has already facilitated a lot,
and the participation of Cuba in the 2009 EU-LAC foreign minister meeting has
been a further step to normalizing relations. Traditionally in favor of opening and
rapprochement towards Cuba, Spain has had an important role in this process and
already held out the prospect of a bilateral agreement. Within the EU, Spain, with its
mainly economic interests in Cuba, has stood against Eastern European member states
and the Netherlands, who have emphasized the importance of human rights over
economic rapprochement. Considering that Cuba is about to undergo dramatic
changes, though nobody can yet say to where they will lead, it will be important for
Europe to have one actor that is considered trustworthy by Cuba. This might be a
potential window of opportunity for promoting European values and for preventing
another repressive regime, or even a failing state, from following this one. With the
Spanish government, against some domestic opposition, acting as a spokesperson
for a different approach than the blockade (the Spanish Foreign Minister recently
pointed out that the 50 years of isolation, confrontation, embargo and blockade have
led nowhere), the European Union could support a Cuban transition process
through economic aid and political reforms while also emphasizing the importance
of human rights. Whether this strategy will be fruitful in the end, however, depends
last but not least on the Cuban attitude: if the civil rights situation does not notice-
ably improve soon the Spanish government will find itself in a difficult position for
promoting a change towards Cuba against the wishes of its own domestic opposi-
tion and parts of the European Union.
For multiple reasons, the Spanish experience in Latin America, i.e. its advantages
resulting from a common culture and language; historical experiences such as colo-
nization, liberation, exile (in both directions, from fascist Spain to the former colo-
nies and later from Latin American military dictatorships to the former motherland);
its respected role in the Ibero-American community; and its experience and recog-
nition as a honest broker are of vital importance to the European Union if it wants
to further strengthen economic ties, promote European values and to catch up the
with the advances less democratic actors, such as Russia and China, have achieved
through their “strategic alliances” with this region. It is for these purposes that the
EU, both economically and normatively, stand to benefit if Spain uses its presidency
to pursue closer relationships with LAC countries.
Conclusion
Ten years ago, the European Union acknowledged the strategic importance of Latin
America and since then it has sought to deepen the relationship with that region.
The traditional Spanish interest in this region has contributed to this process. As
there is further economic and political deepening ahead, the EU can profit from
Spain’s “bridge function”. The announced Madrid summit will be an important step
in deepening the EuLac relationship. Spain can act as a broker on various issues,
from immigration laws to agricultural duties. This is especially important given the
involvement of semi-autocratic states in parts of Latin America. If Europe misses the
chance to intervene and to hold up its own values, it might fall behind competing
actors in the international scene.
In large parts of Latin America Spain enjoys trust and respect in international affairs.
This reputation could be helpful for the European Union in critical political situa-
tions, such as the Honduras coup or the Cuban transition. At the same time, when
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acting according to economic or political interests the EU, and with it Spain, should
never ignore European values in international negotiations. This might especially
apply in the case of Cuba: the position of presidency should not be used to put indi-
vidual domestic economic interests over common European values. Rather, Spain
should use its respected position to point out that civil rights are non-negotiable.
At the same time, it is important that the incumbent Presidency respects the fact that
the new constitutional situation, i.e. the Lisbon Treaty, has changed the institutional
setting. One important goal of the new Treaty is to strengthen the Union’s interna-
tional role. While there might be reasonable doubts about whether the institutional
balance of power is optimal or whether the personnel decisions were the best, the
new institutional settings should be respected and given a chance to prove itself in
foreign policy. However, foreign policy should be carried out in close cooperation
with the other institutional partners. In the specific case examined here, Spain enjoys
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